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Abstract
The paper studies the equilibrium value of bid-ask spreads and time-
to-trade in a continuous-time, intermediated nancial market. The en-
dogenous spreads are the price at which brokers are willing to o¤er imme-
diacy. They include physical trading costs. Traders intervene optimally,
when the portfolio mix reaches endogenously determined barriers. Spreads
and times between successive trades are increasing with the di¤erence in
agents risk attitudes. They react asymmetrically to an increase in the
di¤erence of risk aversions, while they are symmetric in trading costs. We
detect a bias towards cash. Optimal trade is drastically reduced when
costs increase, so as to preserve the investors welfare. Random switches
to a competitive market, to be interpreted as outside options, drastically
reduce bid-ask fees.
It is well known that trading behavior in nancial markets is a¤ected by
its costs. In a competitive market, they are exogenous trading costs. A non-
exhaustive list includes participation costs, such as infrastructure or access costs,
information, search and execution costs, including taxes. In a centralized mar-
ket, traders interact through an intermediary, who faces exogenous costs and,
by standing ready to absorb any order from the rest of the market, provides
the service of immediacy, or immediate liquidity. He is expected to charge a fee
for this service, on top of being reimbursed of the trading costs he absorbs. His
bid-ask spread - which represents the overall transaction cost to investors - will
include both trading costs1 and the price of immediacy.
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1Other Authors call transaction costs the physical costs, while we call them trading
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the bid or ask price and its fundamental value.
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The way in which trading costs a¤ect equilibrium asset prices in the compet-
itive case, as well as the way in which they interact with the price for immediacy
in the intermediated case, is not easy to assess. The reason is that costs go hand
in hand with infrequent trade, as opposite to the standard continuous trading
of frictionless models.
Decentralized models with symmetric information have successfully addressed
general equilibrium asset pricing and trade frequency in the presence of trading
costs, both when investors have the same risk aversion (Vayanos (1998), Lo,
Mamaysky and Wang (2004)), and when they do not (Buss and Dumas (2012)).
They have investigated the e¤ect of trading costs on prices and turnover. Since
trading is competitive, agents simply share exogenous trading costs. The shar-
ing rule is endogenous. In Vayanosoverlapping-generation model, costs have
a small e¤ect on prices, while the trading frequency is dramatically reduced
with respect to a frictionless situation. Investors can refrain from trade even
for decades. Lo et al. point at a more signicant e¤ect of costs on equilibrium
prices. Buss and Dumas go even further. They use the assessed e¤ect on prices
to produce a cost-adjusted CAPM and to explain some empirical asset pricing
puzzles. In terms of trade, the last two papers get smaller times to next trade,
since investors have a so-called high-frequency motive to trade, given by an
innite-variation uctuation in dividends.
Recent models of centralized trading instead provide endogenous bid-ask
spreads but explain it through asymmetric information. These models have
concentrated mostly on a specic source of costs, namely search costs, when
there is the possibility of trading both in a decentralized and centralized way
(Du¢ e, Gârleanu and Pedersen (2005, 2007)).
This paper aims at lling a gap in the literature, by focusing on centralized
trading with symmetric information. It aims at explaining both the level of en-
dogenous spreads and the amount of endogenous, infrequent trading in general
equilibrium. Our starting point is the case in which there are no physical trading
costs, but still the intermediary deserves a fee for the service of immediacy. We
study rst a situation in which investors must trade through the intermediary,
then a situation in which they have the outside optionof waiting and trade
at no cost in a decentralized market. This permits to understand how much
equilibrium bid-ask spread, but also trade frequency, are a¤ected by exogenous
components, such as physical costs, and competition. Up to the best of our
knowledge, this is the rst model which endogenizes bid-ask spreads with sym-
metric information. With respect to decentralized trade, we can split the impact
of exogenous trading costs and intermediary services on spreads.
The paper is expected to enhance the comprehension of the price for inter-
mediation and trade impact of strategic brokers behavior. It aims at doing so
with respect to the partial equilibrium models of investors behavior in the pres-
ence of transaction costs, such as Constantinides (1986) - which take those costs
as exogenous - and with respect to the traditional microstructure literature,
as exemplied by the seminal models in intermediariespricing, such as Stoll
(1978), Ho and Stoll (1981) - which takes the frequency of trade as exogenous.
In order to study equilibrium bid-ask spreads we go back to the simplest
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framework for investorschoices in continuous-time stochastic economies, char-
acterized by a risky and a riskless asset, together with innitely lived, power
utility agents. We assume that a representative investor faces a single broker,
or specialist, who sets the spreads. We verify that the equilibrium conditions
have no solution if the bid-ask spread is null, unless the investor is risk neu-
tral. We show numerically that, if the risk aversion of the agents is diverse,
with brokers less risk averse than investors, an equilibrium exists. Spreads and
the time to next trade are increasing in the di¤erence in risk aversion, while
welfare loss for the investor is not. Bid and ask prices are very sensitive to
risk-aversion di¤erences: the impact of the rst on the second is one order of
magnitude bigger. Also, spreads do not react symmetrically to discrepancies
in risk attitudes and generate a bias towards cash. We present our model and
results rst for the case in which there are no trading costs, then in the presence
of trading costs. Opposite to di¤erences in risk aversion, trading costs generate
symmetric e¤ects on bid-ask prices and barriers. Last but not least, we extend
to the case in which investors can choose either to trade with the specialist at
his bid-ask fee or to wait until another investor, with whom they can trade at no
cost, submits an order to the market. The second situation, in which investors
have an outside-option driven by a regime-switch, provides much smaller fees,
as expected.
The outline of the paper is as follows. Section 1 sets up the model without
trading costs. Section 2 studies the optimization conditions for the two types of
agents (investors and specialist). Section 3 denes equilibrium and studies its
features. Section 4 rules out the existence of equilibrium in which spreads van-
ish. Section 5 provides numerical examples of equilibrium and studies spreads,
trading policy, transaction frequency, welfare implications, as well as their sen-
sitivity to the specialists risk aversion, in comparison to partial equilibrium
models. Section 6 covers the case in which exogenous trading costs exist too..
Section 7 studies the outside-option case and its implication for equilibrium
spreads and trade. Section 8 summarizes and outlines further research.
1 Model set up
This section species the objective of the agents, the admissible transaction
costs and admissible dynamics of traded assets. We consider a continuous-time
stochastic economy in which two assets are traded: a riskless and a risky one.
The interest rate r on the riskless asset is not determined endogenously. The
pre-bid, pre-ask price of the risky asset - its fundamental value, which describes
its dividends - is a geometric Brownian motion with parameters  and . Two
agents populate our economy: a representative investor and a specialist.
The investor maximizes the expected utility of his terminal wealth, EU(W (T )).
He has an innite-horizon power utility, U(W ) =W =. Unless otherwise spec-
ied, we assume that he his risk averse and non-myopic:  < 1;  6= 0. His
objective is
lim
T!1
supEU(W (T )) = lim
T!1
supE [W (T )=] (1)
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The admissible transaction costs are proportional to the value of trade. For each
dollar value of risky security he trades, the investor receives a bid price s and
pays an ask price 1=q, which will be constrained to be respectively smaller and
greater than - or at most equal to - one: s; q  (0; 1]. We will call the di¤erences
1 s; 1=q 1 the transaction costs, in order to distinguish them from the actual
trading costs, which impinge on the broker only and will be introduced in section
6 only. The proportionality constants s and q will be determined in equilibrium
as a function of all the exogenous variables. Since we will search for a stationary
equilibrium, s and q will be constant over time.
The investor takes as given the transaction costs, as well as the risk-return
features of the risky asset. Let x(t) and y(t) be the (fundamental) values of
his riskless and risky position2 . His nal wealth is their liquidation value, i.e.
W (T ) = x(T ) + sy(T ).
The (partial equilibrium) investors optimization problem has been solved
by Dumas and Luciano (1991) for the case of non-innitesimal spreads and
by Gerhold, Guasoni, Muhle-Karbe and Schachermayer (2011) for the case of
innitesimal spreads. It is shown in both papers that - if z is the standard
Brownian motion which drives y - there exist two increasing processes L and U
which make the value of the investors assets evolve according to(
dx(t) = rx(t)dt+ sdU(t)  dL(t)
dy(t) = y(t)dt+ y(t)dz(t) + qdL(t)  dU(t) (2)
The processes L and U increase only when  := y=x; the ratio of risky to riskless
asset in portfolio, reaches respectively a lower and an upper barrier, which we
denote as l and u. Their changes are the local time of the stochastic process 
at the lower and upper barrier. As a consequence, there is no exact notion of
trade size, since the adjustment does not occur in discrete amounts.
In most of what follows, for the sake of simplicity, we restrict our formulas
to parameter combinations which make both barriers positive3 , i.e. 0 < l < u.
To this end, we restrict the parameters so that the optimal asset holdings would
be positive in the absence of transaction costs:
0 <
  r
(1  )2 < 1 (3)
We know that asset holdings with bid-ask spreads include the optimal holdings
in the corresponding frictionless market, l <  < u, where the optimal ratio 
is the standard Mertons one:4y
x

=  =
  r
(1  )2   + r
2Later on y will be called also the pre-spread price: indeed, we do not need to distinguish
prices and values.
3The computations for the other cases, which were used for the numerical implementations,
can be obtained from the Author upon request.
4 In the absence of costs (and intermediaries) not only individuals would keep their asset
ratio at , but, as demonstrated by He and Leland (1993), a geometric Brownian motion
would be the equilibrium asset process for power utility investors.
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With trading frictions, the ratio is not kept at , but the high trading frequency
needs imposed by the innite variation of the underlying fundamental price y
remains.
The specialist pays to the investor the returns on the risky asset5 and stands
ready to absorb all the transactions required by the investor. He charges a bid
and an ask price for this, i.e. he sets s and q. Both the risky and riskless
asset are in zero net supply, so that demand equals supply by denition (this
will be useful in equilibrium). If xs and ys are the specialists asset holdings,
this implies xs =  x, ys =  y and the ratio s = ys=xs is the opposite of the
consumer one, namely s =  . The specialist is a power-utility agent which
aims at maximizing the expected utility Us of his nal wealth, when the horizon
becomes innite:6
lim
T!1
supEUs(W (T )) = lim
T!1
supE
h
W (T )
0
=0
i
(4)
If not specied otherwise, we also assume that he is risk-averse, 1  0 > 0. For
the time being we assume that he does not incur trading costs. This means that
the dynamics of his assets is(
dxs = rxsdt  sdU + dL
dys = ysdt+ ysdz   qdL+ dU
(5)
while his nal wealth is Ws = xs + ys =  x  y.
2 Optimization
This section briey reviews the optimality problem of the investor and in-
troduces ex novo the optimality conditions of the specialist. We search for a
stationary solution to both problems.
2.1 Optimization for the investor
The optimization problem of the investor is well understood in the literature.
Indeed, it is known that, with positive risk aversion, problem (1) under (2)
reduces to solving for the function I the ODE
(r   ) I () + (  r)I 0 ()  + 2I 00 () 
2
2
= 0 (6)
5 In this sense, the risky asset can be interpreted as in Buss and Dumas (2012): it entitles
the investor to receive his risky endowment.
6We rule out constraints on his wealth. In particular, we rule out the possibility of default
of the intermediary.
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- with  2 R - under the value-matching and smooth-pasting BCs, namely8>>><>>>:
lI 0(l) = I(l)"l
uI 0(u) = I(u)"u
lI 00(l) = (   1) I 0(l)"l
uI 00(u) = (   1) I 0(u)"u
where we have used the shortcut notation
"l
:
=
l
l + q
(7)
"u
:
=
us
1 + us
(8)
The function I provides us with the value function of the problem,
lim
T!1
K(x; y; t;T )
:
= lim
T!1
supE [W (T )=]
if there exists a constant  - an articial discount rate - which makes K itself,
once discounted, nite and stationary. Formally, we need  such that
J(x; y; t;T ) = e (T t)K(x; y; t;T )
lim
T!1
J(x; y; t;T ) = J(x; y)
and, given the homotheticity of the utility function, we assume J(x; y) = xI ().
It has also been shown that a solution technique for the above problem
consists of three steps. The steps - which are described in Appendix A - turn
the investors problem into an algebraic equation in the unknown . Having
dened
m
:
= (  r) =2   1=2; (9)

:
=
r(  r   2=2)2   22
2
(10)
and

:
= r   ;
the algebraic equation is
a(l; q)b(u; s)  c(u; s)d(l; q) = 0 (11)
where - using si and co to denote the trigonometric sines and cosines7 - the
7There is also a case where the sines and cosines have to be interpreted as hyperbolic ones,
and slight di¤erences in signs occur. The type of solution depends on whether, having dened
c.
:
=
 
  r   2=22
22
; (12)
we have  > (<)c: (see Appendix A).
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expressions for a; b; c; d are
a(l; q) = ( m  l) si( ln(l)) + co( ln(l))
b(u; s) = ( m  u) co( ln(u))  si( ln(u))
c(u; s) = ( m  u) si( ln(u)) + co( ln(u))
d(l; q) = ( m  l) co( ln(l))  si( ln(l))
(13)
The solutions for  which are acceptable are the ones which make "l and "u real.
For the case of negative (positive) , a straightforward computation shows that
this is the case as long as   () , where
 :=
(  r)2
2(   1)2 : (14)
2.2 Optimization for the specialist
The specialist aims at maximizing his utility from nal wealth, and we let his
horizon diverge, while searching for a stationary solution. However, his instru-
ments are not the trading barriers l and u, but the trading costs s and q. The
specialists problem is subject to the standard value-matching conditions, when
the processes L and U are di¤erent from zero. The FOCs with respect to l and
u which provide the smooth-pasting conditions for the investor though must be
substituted by optimality conditions with respect to s and q. It can be shown
that the value function cannot - and need not - be maximized with respect to
s; q on the whole domain, but at most for specic choices of . The natural
choices are  = l and  = u, since trade occurs at those levels only. Using
the traditional approach to smooth pasting, we set the derivatives of the value
function equal to zero with respect to s and q at  = l and  = u. Let Ks be
the specialists value function, i.e.
lim
T!1
Ks(xs; ys; t;T ) = lim
T!1
supE
h
Ws(T )

0
=0
i
It is easy to show, as in the investors case, that, if we aim at a stationary value
function, we must discount Ks at a rate 
0 := r0   0. We can dene the
discounted value function
Js(xs; ys; t;T ) = e
 0(T t)Ks(xs; ys; t;T )
and assume that it has a stationary limit:
lim
T!1
Js(xs; ys; t;T ) = Js(xs; ys) = x
 0Is():
We end up with the following di¤erential equation for Is :
 
r0   0 Is () + (  r)I 0s ()  + 2I 00s () 22 = 0 (15)
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whose solution is of the type
Is =

 m [A0si(0 ln()) +B0co(0 ln())]
A0x01 + B0x02 (16)
with x01;2 = m 0
0 :=
r(  r   2=2)2   202
2
The value-matching conditions impose continuity of the value function at the
trading points. Indeed, the investor chooses a trading policy which requires his
counterpart to trade so as to stay at the boundary of the trading region too.
We have: 
lIs
0(l) = 0Is(l)"l
uI 0s(u) = 
0Is(u)"u
(17)
where the " are the ones dened above (and decided by the investor). As in
the investors case, these value matching conditions imply that the constant 0
satises
a0(l; q)b0(u; s)  c0(u; s)d0(l; q) = 0 (18)
where8
a0(l; q) = ( m  0l) si(0 ln(l)) + 0co(0 ln(l))
b0(u; s) = ( m  0u) co(0 ln(u))  0si(0 ln(u))
c0(u; s) = ( m  0u) si(0 ln(u)) + 0co(0 ln(u))
d0(l; q) = ( m  0l) co(0 ln(l))  0si(0 ln(l))
In order to take the derivatives of the value function with respect to the
specialists choice variables, recognize that the bid price s applies at the upper
barrier u only, while the ask price 1=q applies at the lower barrier l only. As
a consequence, the derivatives to be equated to zero are with respect to q at l
and with respect to s at u. In taking these derivatives, the broker considers the
investors reaction to his choice of the spreads.9
The optimality conditions of the broker are obtained from (17), di¤erentiat-
ing with respect to q and s, i.e. computing8>><>>:
d
dq
[ 0Is (l) + (q + l) Is 0(l)] = 0
d
ds
[(1 + us) Is
0(u)  0Is(u)s] = 0
8Here too we report the trigonometric case only. In the investors case the equation for
 incorporated both the value-matching and smooth-pasting condition, since the " were de-
termined as in Appendix A. The equation for 0 incorporates the value-matching conditions
only, since the " come from the investorsproblem.
9 It can be demonstrated that an equilibrium in which dealers do not take the reaction
of their counterpart into consideration does not exist. The reaction is evaluated in terms of
barriers, not in terms of traded quantities, since we know that the investor trades so as to
stay along the barriers of the no-transaction cone. The only investors reaction is in terms of
the level, or barrier, not in terms of quantity of intervention, or amount of trade.
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which gives the modiedsmooth-pasting conditions8>><>>:
@l
@q
[(1  0) Is 0(l) + (q + l) Is 00(l)] + Is 0(l) = 0
@u
@s
[(1 + us) Is
00(u) + (1  0) sI 0s(u)]  0Is(u) + uIs(u) = 0
(19)
In the last system we have the derivatives of the boundaries with respect to the
costs, @l@q ;
@u
@s ; which must be obtained from the investors problem solution.
Appendix B shows that, if we compute appropriately these derivatives and sub-
stitute for (17) and (19) into the ODE, we get the following algebraic equations,
which synthesize the value-matching and modiedsmooth-pasting conditions
for the specialist:
0 + "l(  r)0   22 0"2l

1
@l
@q
+ 1  0

= 0 (20)
0 + "u(  r)0 + 22 
0
"2u
h
u
s
1 "u
"u
@u
@s
  1 + 0
i
= 0 (21)
where @l@q and
@u
@s are given in Appendix B.
3 Equilibrium
This section denes an equilibrium for the previous economy and comments on
the properties of its prices and quantities.
An equilibrium in the previous market is a quadruple
 
; 0; s; q

, with s; q 2
(0; 1]2, such that
 the investors maximization problem is solved
 the specialists one is solved too
 and the barriers l and u are real:   () if  < (>)0.
Since, by denition, the specialist absorbs any trading need of the investor,
we do not need to worry about matching demand and supply of the risky and
riskless asset. No market clearing condition is needed, since we are working
with a state variable, the investor risky to riskless ratio  = y=x, which is
equal to the opposite of the corresponding ratio for the specialist s =  ys=xs:
Market clearing is embedded into the choice of the state variable. Overall, an
equilibrium requires that the four algebraic equations (11), (18), (20), (21) -
which we report here for the sake of convenience - be solved at the same time10
with s; q 2 (0; 1]2;   () if  < (>)0.
10For given    r; 2; ; 0; the investors problem is solved once  is found, while the
specialists one is solved once 0; s; q are.
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8>>>>><>>>>>:
ab  cd = 0
a0b0   c0d0 = 0
0 + "l(  r)0   22 0"2l

1
@l
@q
+ 1  0

= 0
0 + "u(  r)0 + 22 
0
"2u
h
u
s
1 "u
"u
@u
@s
  1 + 0
i
= 0
(22)
Equilibrium prices, quantities and trade are as follows.
3.1 Prices
The procedure we follow consists in verifying that the pre bid, pre-ask geometric
Brownian motion11 price specied above is indeed a fundamental value.12 We
know from He and Leland (1993) that it is the equilibrium asset process for
the corresponding economy without intermediaries and transaction costs. In an
intermediated market, investors sell at a constant discount on it, as commanded
by the bid price s, and buy at a surcharge on it, given by the ask price 1=q. The
fundamental value is never observed as a trading price, while sy and y=q are.
They can be observed only when trade occurs, though. There are two di¤erent
trading prices. When trade occurs because the investor reaches his upper bar-
rier, and needs to sell the risky asset, the cum-bid price sy is the observed trading
price; when trade occurs at the lower investors barrier, the cum-ask price y=q
is the observed trading price. Both prices are reduced (substantially reduced,
as we will see in numerical examples) because of transaction costs s and q, even
in the absence of trading costs. This is in the spirit of Amihud and Mendelson
(1986). The ensuing bid-ask spread (per unit value of the underlying) 1=q   s
is going to represent the equilibrium price of immediacy.
In the traditional microstructure literature the bid and ask prices usually de-
pend on the level of inventories. This happens in our case too, since the barriers
l and u represent the agentsinventories, and the equilibrium conditions from
which s and q are determined involve l and u. Both prices are still decreasing
with inventories13 .
11 In the inventory-based microstructure literature there is a constant fundamental value of
the asset, to which cum-spread prices tend to revert. This mean reversion does not exist in our
model, since pre-spread prices are geometric Brownian motions, while spreads are constant
and time-independent. This makes our model consistent with the lack of mean reversion on
brokers prices, as empirically detected, for instance, by Madhavan and Smidt (1991) in equity
markets.
12We do not have enough structure to determine asset prices via stochastic discount factors.
In this sense the process y is not a standard equilibrium price, but a fundamental value
or cumulated dividend process. As such it appears in the individuals budget constraints.
Investors are willing to pay for an asset its stream of dividends adjusted for the bid or ask
spread (depending on whether they sell or buy). This is similar to Lo et al. (2004).
13A main di¤erence between our model and traditional inventory ones is the lack of mean
reversion in the inventory level of the broker (l; u). Some inventory-based models do indeed
determine a preferred inventory position for the broker, to which he aims at reverting. In our
model the brokers inventory, measured by the ratio s = , uctuates between l and u, and
is kept within those barriers because of the optimal policies of investors. There is no optimal
portfolio for the broker itself. As a consequence, we do not have problems in matching the
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3.2 Quantities
It is known that L and U are the local times of the process y=x at l; u re-
spectively: trade per unit of time is innitesimal, with innite total and nite
quadratic variation. In this sense, there is no order size in the traditional
sense of the microstructure literature. However, knowing that the portfolio ra-
tio stays between the barriers and using the properties of local times of regulated
Brownian motion, the moments of trade can be computed.
The price and quantity features just listed are consistent with the ndings
in Buss and Dumas (2012) for a competitive market. Despite the fact that their
bid-ask spread is exogenous and time is discrete, since their endowment evolves
as a binomial tree, and our risky assets fundamental value evolves as Brownian
motion, in both cases transaction prices and trades have innite total and nite
quadratic variation.
3.3 Trade frequency
The trading policy behind our equilibrium is such that observed trade is not
continuous in time, but infrequent. The frequency of trade will depend on the
distance between the barriers l and u. The closer the barriers, the more frequent
trade will be.
It is clear from the equilibrium conditions that spreads and trade will de-
pend on the risk aversion of market participants. It is quite intuitive that an
equilibrium will exist if the broker is less risk averse than the investor. Pagano
and Roell (1989) already proved that brokers trade only with customers more
risk averse than themselves.14 Before investigating this - as well as the spread
and trade dependence on the di¤erence in risk aversion between market partici-
pants - in the next section we show that the spread can be zero if and only if the
specialist is never requested to participate in the market. In turn, we know from
optimality conditions without bid-ask spreads that this occurs if the investor is
risk-neutral.
4 No bid-ask spread case
We do not expect the broker to provide immediacy for free, by setting the bid
and ask price equal to the fundamental price, s = q = 1. We can envisage
an exception, though: the broker can accept zero fees, if he does not need to
intervene. We expect an equilibrium without costs to exist if the investor does
lack of empirical mean reversion in inventories.
14 In Pagano and Roells set up, brokers set the bid-ask price competitively, by equating
the utility they get with and without operating as brokers. Investors equate the utility they
get when selling (buying) in a brokersmarket with the one they get when selling (buying)
in a competitive market, i.e. an auction or limit-order one. When customers are more risk
averse than brokers, the possibility of trading depends also on the spread which would prevail
on a competitive market and on the probability of nding a counterpart in it. When trade
occurs in the brokersmarket, the spread magnitude depends on the di¤erence between the
risk attitudes of brokers and investors, exactly as in our setting.
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not trade. We can verify that this is correct for risk-neutral investors, since
we know that - without transaction costs - the no-trade barriers collapse to the
optimal Mertons holding, ; and that for risk-neutral investors this holding is
-1.
We aim at proving that the system (22) admits no solution when s = q = 1;
and consequently l = u = , unless  = 1. The proof is as follows. With
s = q = 1 or no costs, the rst two equilibrium conditions in (22) do not
determine the rates ; 0 any more. At  =  =  r(1 )2 +r the rates of
growth are instead the usual (
 = ( r)
2
22

1 
0 = ( r)
2
22
0
1 0
The last two equilibrium equations in (22), once evaluated at s = u = 1; l =
u = , become8>><>>:
( r)2
22
0
1 0 +
( r)2
(1 )2 
0   22 0

 r
(1 )2
2 
1
@l
@q jl=;s=q=1
+ 1  0

= 0
( r)2
22
0
1 0 +
( r)2
(1 )2 
0
+ 
2
2 
0

 r
(1 )2
2  (1 )2 +r
 r
@u
@s ju=;s=q=1
  1 + 0

= 0
They can be solved at the same time if and only if the ratio of the barriers
sensitivity to costs is equal to the optimal riskless to risky holding:
 
@u
@s ju=;s=q=1
@l
@q jl=;s=q=1
=
(1  )2   + r
  r > 0
It is easy to show that the previous equality - under mild technical conditions
on the derivatives of a; b; c; d - is satised if and only if  ! 1, i.e. the investor is
risk neutral. We indeed know that in this case is optimal investment allocation
 !  1, and he does not need an intermediary to optimally balance his wealth.
This shows that risk-neutral investors - who do not trade - may be granted zero
bid-ask spreads, as intuition would command.
5 Examples
The equilibrium conditions provided above cannot be solved explicitly. We
discuss them starting from a base-case, which is calibrated to the pioneering
literature in single investors optimality with transaction costs (Constantinides
(1986)). We expect the spreads to be quite bigger than the observed ones, since
we have homogenous investors and no outside-option. We are also ready to
obtain a frequency of trade low with respect to actual market frequencies, since,
on top of the presence of two agents only, in order to keep the model tractable, we
disregard some important motives to trade, such as speculative reasons arising
from asymmetric information or hedging motives due to incompleteness of the
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market (also without transaction costs). In this respect, the results of the base-
case should be interpreted as those of Buss and Dumas (2012) or Lo et al.
(2004): there is no attempt to calibrate a specic market.
In section 5.1 we obtain the equilibrium quadruple in the base-case and
discuss the resulting bid-ask spread, transaction policy, expected time to next
trade and rate of growth of derived utility, in comparison with their partial
equilibrium (or investor-only) values. In section 5.2 we discuss the impact of
the di¤erence in risk aversions on the results.
5.1 Base case
Starting from the fundamental risk-return base-case in Constantinides (1986),
i.e.  r = 5%; 2 = 4%, we assume a coe¢ cient of risk aversion for the investor
equal to 1   = 4, and a brokers risk aversion slightly smaller: 1  0 = 3:85.
This section shows - among other things - that
 spreads are one order of magnitude bigger than the (percentage) di¤erence
in risk aversion which justies them, but expected times to next trade
are lower than in the corresponding partial equilibrium models. These
models were by denition unable to capture the e¤ect of risk-aversion
heterogeneity among market participants. By so doing, they overestimated
trade inertia, for a given level of costs. The result we obtain reconciles low
heterogeneity in risk aversion - which seems to be an empirically relevant
phenomenon, see for instance Xiouros and Zapatero (2010) and references
therein - with reasonable levels of trade frequency. These are close to
weeks or months, not to years or decades as in similarly-calibrated partial-
equilibrium models;
 the no-trade region presents a bias toward cash. This bias does not depend
on consumption-on-the way. It just depends on the bigger sensitivity of
ask prices with respect to risk-aversion di¤erence. This could help in
explaining the equity-premium puzzle.
The investor-broker equilibrium is indeed characterized by the quadruple15 
; 0; s; q

= (0:023428; 0:023687; 97:53%; 68:41%);
with barriers equal to
l = 0:301825 <  < u = 0:480013:
since the corresponding no-cost problem has optimal portfolio mix
 = 0:4545
15For the given parametrization, c = 0:01125,  = 0:0234375. Since both  and 0 are
greater than c, the roots of the algebraic equation corresponding to (6), which is equation
(42) in Appendix A - and its equivalent for the broker - are imaginary. The transaction
boundaries are real, since  < :
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Let us denote with an index p the corresponding partial-equilibrium solutions.
Keeping costs at the level provided in general equilibrium, for the sake of com-
parison, barriers become equal to16
lp = 0:1495 < 
 < up = 0:8243:
while the discount rate p becomes 0:0192.
5.1.1 Bid-ask spread
Let us comment on the equilibrium bid/ask spread rst. The equilibrium bid
price is approximately equal to s = 97:5% of the pre-bid quote, the ask price
is equal to 1=q = 1=68:4% = 146% of it. The bid-ask spread - or round-trip
cost - amounts to 1=q   s = 48:5%. With a unique broker and no outside-
option, a tiny di¤erence in risk aversion (3.75%) justies huge costs and a huge
spread in equilibrium. The latter is one order of magnitude bigger than the risk
aversion (percentage) di¤erence. This seems to be a very high number, but
nds a justication in the facts mentioned at the beginning of section 5. The
bid-ask spread is not calibrated to empirically observed values. By using the
parameters of the previous transaction-cost, partial-equilibrium literature, we
simply aim at stressing how important a subtle di¤erence in risk aversion of
market participants can be in terms of price of immediacy. It is very likely to
be a¤ected also by the monopoly power of the broker. For this reason, in a later
section we weaken his position by introducing outside options. We consider the
monopolistic case worth analyzing, because of the sensitivities and asymmetries
it unveals, more than because of the absolute level of spreads it entails.
5.1.2 No-trade region
Let us see the e¤ects on the no-trade region. If costs are kept the same between
the general and partial equilibrium (in the former being endogenous), we nd
that the intervention barriers are further apart in the partial-equilibrium than
in the equilibrium case:
l   lp = 0:15; up   u = 0:34
and the no-transaction cone in partial equilibrium incorporates the general equi-
librium one:
[insert here gure 1]
This means that partial-equilibrium models are likely to have overstated
the magnitude of no trade, even though they perfectly captured the trading
mechanism. In a general-equilbrium perspective, the investor is less reluctant
to trade, since the specialist has forecasted his customers reaction when xing
16The investors problem is solved by  = 0:0192 > c.
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the costs. In terms of optimal overall portfolio mix, as measured by the ratio of
risky to total assets, y=(x+ y), the equilibrium values are
l
1 + l
= 0:23;
u
1 + u
= 0:32
while the partial-equilibrium ones are
lp
1 + lp
= 0:13;
up
1 + up
= 0:45
The no-cost optimal mix would be

1 + 
= 0:31
As expected, even in terms of overall portfolio mix, the barriers are closer to
the no-cost situation in the general-equilibrium case. Both in terms of risky to
riskless ratio and overall portfolio mix, the percentage di¤erences between the
general and partial equilibrium situation are one order of magnitude bigger than
the risk-aversion di¤erence which justies them.
5.1.3 Bias towards cash
The barriers of intervention of the investor are less symmetric with respect
to the optimal ratio in the absence of costs, i.e.  = 0:45, than without an
intermediary, i.e. in partial equilibrium. This results from the comparison of
the barriers
   l = 0:15; u   = 0:03
   lp = 0:30; up    = 0:37
or from the comparison of the optimal portfolio mix:

1 + 
  l
1 + l
= 0:078;
u
1 + u
  

1 + 
= 0:013
lp
1 + lp
  

1 + 
= 0:42;
up
1 + up
  

1 + 
= 1:46
This permits us to comment on the bias towards cash - the riskless asset - which
Constantinides found in the partial equilibrium model with consumption. There
it was justied by consumption itself, since it vanished with interim consump-
tion, unless the horizon were nite (Liu and Loewenstein (2002)). In our case
the bias comes back, even without interim consumption, since the equilibrium
magnitude of costs is not symmetric: ask spreads 1=q  1 are much bigger than
bid ones 1   s. We are going to argue below that investors would command
a liquidity premium to switch from an hypothetical market without costs - hy-
pothetical because it would have no trade - to an equilibrium with costs. The
presence of a bias towards cash suggests that this liquidity premium should be
particularly high.
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5.1.4 Trade frequency
The spread and no-trade region features produce trade frequencies which - all
others equal - are more realistic than partial equilibrium frequencies. Par-
tial equilibrium models were overestimating the reduction in trade provided
by transaction costs. Still, trade is far from being continuous. The frequency of
trade can be measured by the expected time that the process  takes in order
to reach either the upper u or the lower barrier l, starting from the optimal mix
. Between l and u,  has drift  =    r and di¤usion . Standard results
in the theory of the rst passage time of a Brownian motion through either an
upper or a lower boundary tell us that the expected time we are searching for is
t =
1
2
2   
2664lnl

 
1 


l
1  2
2
1   ul 1  22 ln
u
l
3775
In the cum-specialist equilibrium just described, the expected time between
transactions is close to 6 months:
t = 0:508
A tiny di¤erence in risk aversion of the participants then makes trade infrequent.
The expected time would be
t ' 13
years in the corresponding partial-equilibrium case, since the barriers are more
distant from the Mertons line.
Partial equilibrium models, all others equal, were overestimating the impact
not only on the no-trade region, but also on trade infrequency. The expected
time between interventions we obtain is huge in comparison with the continuous
trading of the frictionless literature, but more realistic than the partial equilib-
rium one. This is in line with what Constantinides aimed at showing, early
in the development of the transaction-cost literature, as well as with empirical
evidence, largely interpreted, where trading is never a continuum.
Let us compare with the trading frequency obtained in the competitive-
equilibrium models of Buss and Dumas (2012) and Lo et al. (2004), in which
agents split exogenous trading costs. With a similar assumption on the agents
endowment (innite variation), similar values for the fundamental value of the
risky asset (instantaneous return and di¤usion) and a much bigger di¤erence
in the agentsrisk aversion, Buss and Dumas get a mean waiting time between
successive transactions which goes up to two years, when the round-trip trans-
action cost is 20%. They have a trade frequency similar to our with smaller
costs, then. Since in their model there is no intermediary extracting a rent from
investors, this says that similar trade infrequencies are consistent with di¤er-
ent market organizations. In a competitive market, it is achieved by investors
further apart in risk aversion, with smaller - but exogenous - costs. Here it
is achieved with smaller risk aversion di¤erence and higher costs (due to the
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rent). Lo et al. have an high frequency motive for trade and xed costs. So,
their trade should be boosted by the rst motive, kept low by the second. As
a result, they have calibrated examples in which - for volatility levels compa-
rable to our choices - the expected time between transactions is close to our.
We interpret this result as showing that, as in Buss and Dumascase, di¤erent
market settings can provide the same optimal trading frequency. In Lo et al.,
the trading frequency can reach years, when xed costs increase. In our case
such a high trading frequency would require a much higher di¤erence in risk
aversion (see below).
Last, we can compare with partial-equilibrium models with transaction costs
and a nite horizon. Our results are in line with the assertion of Liu and
Loewenstein (2002), who note that even small transaction costs lead to dra-
matic changes in the optimal behavior for an investor: from continuous trading
to virtually buy-and-hold strategies. They are less extreme, since in their case
costs ranging from 3 to 16%, i.e. in the order of magnitude of s above, together
with the same expected return and volatility and similar risk aversion, led to
expected transaction times of around 10 to 20 years. The di¤erence is due to
the nite horizon, which - all others equal - makes more unlikely that costs
can be recouped. As a consequence, the frequency of trade drops even more
dramatically than in an innite-horizon case, where transaction costs can be
compensated by the excess return on risky securities. As soon as transaction
costs are not innitesimal, the nite and innite-time expected transaction fre-
quencies are quite signicantly di¤erent. In order to achieve a buy and hold
strategy in the present setting, while keeping all the other parameters xed, we
should consider a market maker with lower risk aversion, i.e. risk aversion much
further from the investors one. We will indeed see below that, when his risk
aversion lowers, and gets further from his counterparts one, the investors trade
frequency decreases.
5.1.5 Welfare implications
We still need to verify that at least in the base-case welfare - which here is
measured by the rate of growth of expected utility - moves in the right direction
when going from a non-intermediated market to an intermediated one. To do so,
let us comment on the last couple of equilibrium parameters, namely  and 0.
They indeed determine the rate of growth of the indirect utility of the investor
and broker,  and 0 respectively17 . Given that  = r   , the higher is ; the
smaller the rate of growth of the corresponding agent. Analogously for 0: Since
 = 2:34% > p = 1:92%;
the investors rate of growth of expected utility in the current equilibrium, ,
is smaller than in the corresponding partial equilibrium. The presence of a
(monopolistic) market maker a¤ects this rate in the expected direction.
17Recall that, since utility stays bounded when discounted at the rate , it grows at  when
it is not articially discounted.
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Starting from this, we could determine the liquidity discount that investors
would tolerate, costs being equal, in order to go from a general to a partial
equilibrium. This means to determine under which    r investors see their
welfare growth una¤ected by the strategic specialists intervention. Practically,
it means to solve for   r the investors problem with p = 2:34%.
We could also determine which liquidity premium investors would command
in order to keep their welfare una¤ected when going from a no-cost equilibrium
to an intermediated one. This computation, which would parallel the exam done
for partial equilibrium by Constantinides (1986), has the disadvantage that - as
we know - the no-cost equilibrium is made by homogenous agents and has no
trade. In the base-case studied so far, it would consist in solving for    r
the investors and specialists problems. In doing that, it would be necessary
to keep the rate of growth of derived utility of the investor at the level it has
in the absence of costs, while the brokers rate should be kept xed at the
equilibrium-with-costs level, 0 = 2:34%.
It has been shown by Constantinides (1986) that the liquidity premium has
a second order e¤ect on asset prices, in the sense that the ratio of the liquidity
premium - as dened above - to percentage transaction costs is smaller than one;
Jang, Koo, Liu and Loewenstein (2007) showed that - if returns are not IID -
its e¤ect is of the rst order, since the ratio is above one. Both papers drew the
conclusion in partial equilibrium. Buss and Dumas (2012) explore the issue in
a competitive, general equilibrium whose assumptions are similar to our, apart
from the fact that - since there is perfect competition - there is no endogenous
price for immediacy. Only exogenous trading costs exist. The liquidity premium
they nd - after having solved for the pricing kernel - is one order of magnitude
smaller than the trading costs, but increasing (and concave) in them. One can
conclude from their CAPM that transaction costs are likely to contribute to the
explanation of the equity premium puzzle, the more so the higher are transaction
costs. Since our costs for immediacy are ten times bigger than Buss and Dumas
trading costs, the possibility of having both intermediated and competitive trade
could probably raise the liquidity premium so as to push the equity premium in
the right direction.
5.2 Sensitivity analysis
This section explores the spread, trade and welfare implications of changing the
participants risk aversion. By decreasing the risk aversion of the broker, or
making it further from the investors one, we nd equilibria characterized by
lower s and q, which means that bid prices decrease, ask prices and the overall
spread and transaction costs increase. Table 1 below gives a comprehensive
sensitivity analysis of the equilibrium bid prices, q values, control or no-trade
limits, expected time between interventions and growth rates as a function of
the brokers risk aversion18 .
18A similar analysis could be conducted by varying the volatility parameter .
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Table 1
1  0 s q l u t 0 
3.85 0.975 0.684 0.3018 0.4800 0.508 0.023687 0.023428
3.815 0.946 0.656 0.2869 0.4992 0.973 0.023824 0.023421
3.8 0.935 0.645 0.2811 0.5068 1.176 0.023892 0.023418
3.75 0.900 0.610 0.2644 0.5294 1.839 0.024166 0.023412
3.7 0.869 0.582 0.2530 0.5465 2.385 0.024506 0.023411
3.6 0.841 0.560 0.2435 0.5647 2.973 0.024904 0.02341
The bid-ask prices behavior is presented in gure 2 below, as a function of
the di¤erence between the agentsrisk aversions, 0   :
[insert here gure 2]
Both s and q decrease, at a similar rate. This has an asymmetric impact on
trading prices, since the bid price goes down from 97:5% to 84%, while the ask
one increases from 1=68:4% = 146% to 1=56% = 178%. The absolute di¤erence
is approximately 13 percentage points in the rst case, 32 in the second. The
behavior of costs with respect to the di¤erence in risk aversion is apparently
counter intuitive. The more distant agents are in risk aversion, i.e. the better
risk sharing should work, the higher is the spread. However, we will show in a
few lines that the results on barriers, trade frequency and - consequently - the
derived utility growth will reconcile this fact with intuition. Welfare - resulting
from spreads and optimal trade - moves as risk-sharing commands, even though
spreads do not seem to move in the intuitive direction.
Compare now with the microstructure, inventory-based models, such as Ho
and Stoll (1981). In most of these models the ask price increases and the bid one
decreases with the intermediarys risk aversion. Table 1 shows that in our case
the opposite holds: as risk aversion increases, 1=q decreases while s increases.
This happens exclusively because the di¤erence in risk aversion between the
two counterparts matters. In our model the ask price 1=q decreases and the bid
one s increases - thus reducing the bid-ask spread - as the brokers risk aversion
goes up and the investors one remains xed, i.e. when the di¤erence between
their risk aversions goes down (from :4 to :15 in Table 1).
As for trading barriers, since lower risk aversion for the broker entails in-
creases in transaction costs, the lower barrier l decreases, while the upper one
u goes up. In the plane x   y, the cone of no-transactions, characterized by
l <  < u, becomes wider. Investors become more tolerant with respect to dis-
crepancies between their actual asset mix and the optimal, Mertons one, : In
partial equilibrium, this happens as a result of an increase in the investors risk
aversion (see for instance Constantinides (1986)). Here, even if the investors
attitude towards risk does not change, his counterparts decreased risk aversion
makes him more reluctant to trade, since his costs in doing so increase. Figure
3 shows the behavior of the barriers as a function of the di¤erence between the
specialist and investors risk aversion
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[insert here gure 3]
By putting together the behavior of the bid-ask spread and the barriers, and
recalling that barriers correspond to inventories in the microstructure literature,
we observe that not only both the bid and the ask price separately depend on
inventories, as was clear from the equilibrium denition, but also the bid-ask
spread does. Indeed, going down Table 1, the spread changes and the barriers do.
In traditional microstructure models, inventories disappear as determinants of
the spread, while being determinants of its components, the bid and ask prices,
because of symmetry and linearity assumptions in the demand by investors.
OHara (1997) already anticipated that independence of the spread from the
level of inventories was not very intuitive, and could probably be overcome by
relaxing the traditional assumption of a constant fundamental - or pre-spread
- value for the underlying good19 . Our model has no symmetry and linearity
assumptions on demand, which is endogenized. More than that, and consistently
with OHaras intuition, our equilibrium builds on a non-constant fundamental
value. Table 1 shows that the bid price s is countermonotonic with respect
to the upper trading barrier u: the higher is the broker inventory, the lower is
his bid price. The ask price 1=q is countermonotonic in the lower barrier l: the
higher is the broker inventory, the lower is his ask price. The bid-ask spread
1=q s almost doubles when going from top to bottom in the Table, as OHaras
suggestion commands.
Figure 3 reports the optimal holdings without transaction costs  too. By
so doing, it puts into evidence the asymmetry, or bias toward cash, when trans-
action costs increase. Going down the Table, the lower barrier l departs from
the optimal ratio without transaction costs,  = 0:454 5, more than the upper
one u: the cone opens up more towards the lower part and people tend to hold
more cash than if the barriers opened in a symmetric way. This e¤ect, which we
noticed for the base-case, is preserved when costs increase because risk aversions
depart. It is due to the interaction of broker and investor, which makes costs on
the ask side increase more than costs on the bid side. It is the e¤ect on trade
of the greater sensitivity of ask with respect to bid prices. It follows from the
sensitivity of s and q with respect to the di¤erence in risk aversions, visualized
in Figure 2.
The frequency of trade adjusts according to the barriersmovement: the
expected time to the rst intervention t goes up from 6 months to 3 years
when risk aversion of the broker decreases. So, in order to obtain a trade
frequency of the order of decades we would probably need a very high di¤erence
in risk aversion.
The rates of growth of indirect utility move too:  slightly decreases, while
0 increases when risk aversion of the broker decreases (or the two get further
apart). This means that  = r  slightly increases. The adjustment of trade -
i.e., the opening up of the no-transaction region between l and u - is so large as to
make the whole rate of growth of utility go up, even if transaction costs increase.
19All others equal, she claims that "the movement of a xed spread around the true price
may no longer be optimal if the price itself is moving".
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Not only intervention is rare in time, but such policy is so e¤ective that it may
make the whole rate of growth of utility increase even when transaction costs go
up20 . The less a broker is risk averse, i.e. the further in risk aversion he is from
his customer, the less his prices will be advantageous for the latter. However,
the latter decreases trade so much that his utilitys growth rate increases. So,
an increase in risk sharing possibilities - because the two market participants
are further apart in risk aversion - does not show up in the bid-ask spread. It
shows up, as it should, in the welfare of investors.
6 Equilibrium with physical costs
We now focus on an equilibrium in which the specialist imposes the bid-ask
spread represented by s; q to his counterpart, but su¤ers external or physical
costs of trading, which he does not pocket. This increases his cash outow for
each unit of risky asset bought from s to s0 > s, while - for any unit of cash
inow - it modies the value of the risky-asset sale to q0 > q: Trading costs are
exogenous, as in Lo et al. (2004) or Buss and Dumas (2012); without loss of
generality, we assume that the ratio s0=s; q0=q is equal to k > 1.
6.1 Model update
Trading costs can be modelled by keeping s and q in the investors SDEs (2)
and inserting s0 > s; q0 > q in the specialists ones (5). The brokers nal wealth
becomes Ws = xs + (s0   s)ys =  x  (s0   s)y:
It is easy to show that, in order to nd an equilibrium with exogenous trading
costs on top of endogenous bid-ask spreads, one needs to solve for
 
; 0; s; q

the following equations:8>>>>>>>>>><>>>>>>>>>>:
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(23)
20The opposite could happen for the broker: when his risk aversion decreases, 0 could
decreases. This would mean that, in spite of applying higher costs, he su¤ers in terms of
utility growth, because investors do not visit him very often. Since r is not specied, though,
we do not know whether the brokers utility does cumulate at a higher or lower rate 0. It
is interesting to notice that the two rates tend to coincide when risk aversions do (i.e., when
1   0 ! 4);as one expects. Recall though that when the spread disappears equilibrium
vanishes (since  6= 1).
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where we have dened
"0l
:
=
l
l + q0
=
l
l + qk
"0u
:
=
us0
1 + us0
=
usk
1 + usk
6.2 Numerical results
Using the same asset parameters as in the base-case, namely   r = 5%; 2 =
4%, and keeping the investors risk aversion at 1    = 4, as in that case, we
explored the equilibrium for a number of possible impacts of external costs k
and brokers risk aversion 1  0.
Knowing that - without external costs - equilibria with moderate bid-ask
spread exist when the risk aversions of the two agents are closer - the investors
one being still bigger than his brokers - we explore here the case in which the
two di¤er by 1%, i.e. 1   0 = 3:96. As soon as the risk aversion di¤erence is
such as to produce moderate transaction costs in the absence of external costs
(as it happens when 0 ! ), we have equilibria also with very high external
costs. All others equal, we considered several levels of external costs k. In table
2 we present three of them, for k between 22% (bottom) and 29% (top). We
nd that s goes from 99:5 to 98:2%, q from 65:5 to 60%.
Table 2
k s q l u t 0 
1.29 0.982 0.597 0.2346 0.5318 2.232 0.023327 0.023212
1.223 0.997 0.626 0.2488 0.5182 1.721 0.023354 0.023245
1.219 0.9953 0.655 0.2688 0.5043 1.211 0.023402 0.023324
These equilibria provide us with new information. They are able to tell us
that the price of immediacy - and the width of the no-trade cone - grows when
the intermediary su¤ers external costs - as expected - and how it does. First, the
bid-ask spread is monotonic in the magnitude of external costs, as expected. In
the range examined, the bid-ask spread goes from 69% (top) to 53% (bottom).
It is much greater than it is without costs: in Table 1, the spread was already
49% with a risk aversion of 3.85 on the part of the broker, while here it is 53%
at the minimum, even though the risk aversions are much closer. Second, also
the cone opens up in a monotonic way. The lower trading barrier increases, the
upper one decreases from top to bottom. Third, the increase is not so much
pronounced: even though physical costs range from 22 to 29% of s or q, the bid-
ask spread and the barriers are not so far from what they were for pure rent.
The spread - as well as the cone - seems to be mostly justied by the market
structure, not by physical costs. Fourth, the increase in the spread and the
opening of the no-trade region are almost symmetric for sales and purchases.
From top to bottom, the lower barrier goes from 0.2346 to 0.2688, while the
upper one ranges from 0.5318 to 0.5043, so the di¤erence is more or less 0.03
in the rst and 0.04 in the second case. Even though the barriers do not have
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the same sensitive with respect to physical costs, since the absolute change in
the lower barrier is more or less the double than the change in the upper one,
that di¤erence in sensitivity remains the same when the level of physical costs
changes. There is no asymmetry or bias towards cash generated by an increase
in costs. Only the initial distance from the optimal ratio  (and its sensitivity)
is bigger for the lower than for the upper barrier.
The expected time to trade after a re-adjustment increases with respect to
the no-cost case, as expected from the spread behavior. Reading now from
bottom to top, it ranges from 1.21 to 2.23 years. When costs go up, trade
becomes more infrequent. As a result, the investors  goes slightly down, his
welfare  slightly increases. So, as in the case without costs, the trading policy
is so e¤ective that it counterbalances the specialists pricing policy.
Overall, Table 2 provides further ground for the comparisons with the models
of Buss and Dumas or Lo et al. which we conducted in the previous section.
In our case, including or not physical costs - which are the only ones in the
related literature - does not move very much the numerical results and does not
change the symmetries or asymmetries, including the bias toward cash and the
e¤ectiveness of the trading policy in terms of welfare.
The presence of spreads comonotonic with external trading costs permits
to compare with the models of decentralized trading with endogenous spreads
mentioned in the introduction, i.e. Du¢ e et al. (2005). Even though they have
asymmetric information and outside options, which are respectively ruled out
and do not make sense in our model, Du¢ e et al. (2005) show that bid-ask
spreads are lower if the chance to meet and trade with another agent is easier.
In their setting, this typically happens for bigtraders, who are able to contact
more counterparts. Such result makes their contribution profoundly di¤erent
from the traditional information-based literature, which assigns greater spreads
to more informed - intuitively, bigger - investors. In our setting, Du¢ es
et al. results can be reproduced by comparing markets with di¤erent trading
costs. Our cross-market predictions then are similar to their, i.e. give lower
spreads when the access to counterparts is easier, for instance because they
are big. In this sense, our cum-broker equilibrium provides an extremely
stylized description of OTC markets, certainly poorer than the Du¢ e et al.
one, but with an explicit, motivating role for risk aversion21 . In addition, since
trade frequency is endogenous in our setting, the traders which deserve smaller
spreads are the ones which intervene more frequently. This is consistent with
them being bigtraders.
21The extension to risk-averse market participants in Du¢ e et al. (2007) introduces a role
for di¤erential behavior in front of the risky asset. In their case markets participants all
have the same risk attitude, but are heterogeneous in background risk, i.e. in the correlation
between their endowment and the risky asset. As a consequence, a direct comparison with
our di¤erence in risk attitude does not seem to be straightforward.
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7 Equilibrium with outside option
7.1 Model
In this section we give investors the outside option to wait and trade in a com-
petitive market, instead of trading with the intermediary. This should enable
us to understand how much competitionis likely to a¤ect equilibrium bid-ask
spreads. In order to model the outside option, we assume that over the next
instant the market can still be an intermediated one, or investors can nd them-
selves in a state where they can trade competitively at no cost. To keep the
model simple, we indeed disregard physical trading costs.
We investigate a continuous two-state Markov-regime model, meant to for-
malize the idea that investors can either trade in the intermediated market or
wait until a counterpart in the decentralized market arrives and trade with them.
In the rst regime or state s1 the investor can trade only with the specialist and
undergoes transaction costs 1 s,1=q 1. In the second regime or state s2 he can
match his trade with other investors and transact without costs. The switching
among the two states Xt = s1; s2 is governed by a Markov transition matrix Q
where the entries Qi;j , i; j 2 1; 2 are dened as
Qi;j =
(
lim infh!0
1 P (X(t+h)=sijX(t)=sj
h ) i = j
lim infh!0
P (Xt+h=sijX(t)=sj)
h i 6= j
We specify Q so that  Qi;i = Qi;j , i 6= j :
Q =
  1 1
2  2

1 2 > 0:
This means that conditional on being in state s1, s2 at time t, the regime
process is Poisson with instantaneous switching intensity 1, 2. The transition
probability from one state to the other is
P (X(t+ h) = jjX(t) = i) = ij +Qijh+ o(h);
where ij is the Kronecker delta. The stationary distribution, i.e. the long run
proportion the process spends in states s1 and s2 for t!1 is  = (2; 1).
7.1.1 The investor problem
The maximization problem for the investor becomes a system in the two value
functions J i1 , J i2 - which apply respectively when starting from state s1 and s2
- which can be written and solved as in Dimitrakas (2008):8>><>>:
max
z

rxJ i1x + yJ
i1
y +
2
2
y2J i1yy   ( + 1)J i1 + 1J i2

= 0
max
A(Lt;Ut)

rxJ i2x + yJ
i2
y +
2
2
y2J i2yy   ( + 2)J i2 + 2J i1

= 0
(24)
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Assume that22 J i1 = (x+y) and J i2 = xK(y=x) by homotheticity; transform
the variables as follows:  = y=x, y = =(1 + )W , x = 1=(1 + )W and
substitute. From (24) we get the value ofK as the solution of the corresponding
homogeneous equation plus a particular solution 23Kp of the complete equation:
K() = A1 +B2 +Kp(): (25)
Here A;B are two constants, 1; 2 are the roots of the characteristic polynomial
of the second degree equation:
(   1) + (  r) + 
2
2
(  1) = 0:
and  = r    as in the previous sections.
In the no-cost state the investor should keep his portfolio at the optimum
ratio  dictated by the Mertons solution. Substituting K in the rst equation
and writing down the rst order condition for the max with respect to , we get
the following two equations:

(1  )

(  r) 1+    
2
2


1+
2
     1

C =  1 K(
)
(1+)1  (26)h
  r   1  2 1+
i
C = 1
K()
(1+)  +
1
 1
K0()
(1+)  1 (27)
By value-matching and smooth-pasting, the boundary conditions at lower and
upper levels  = l; u of the no-transaction zone are:
K 0(l) =

q + l
K(l) (28)
K 00(l) =
   1
q + l
K 0(l) (29)
K 0(u) =

1=s+ u
K(u) (30)
K 00(u) =
   1
1=s+ u
K 0(u) (31)
Hence, the investors problem is solved when eq. (26)-(31) are satised with K
given by (25).
7.1.2 The specialist problem
Also for the specialist there are two di¤erent value functions, depending on the
state he starts from. Since the specialist does not transact in state s1, there is
22Notice that Ji1 is homogeneous of degree  and at the optimum Ji1x = J
i1
y
23Kp() =
22C
2(1 2)

z2
R 
M
(1+t)1 
t2+1
dt  1 R M (1+t)1 t1+1 dt :M is the initial condi-
tion set to the Mertons solution.
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no optimization in state s1and he can optimize only in state s2. The two value
functions Js1 ,Js2 are dened as:
Js1(x; y; t;T )
:
= lim
T!1
E
h
e 
0(T t)W (T )=
i
(32)
Js2(x; y; t;T )
:
= lim
T!1
supE
h
e 
0(T t)W (T )=
i
(33)
The system of equations which characterize these value functions can be written
as: 8<: J
s1
x rx+ J
s1
y y + J
s1
yy
2y2=2  (0 + 1)Js1 + 1Js2 =0
max
s;q

Js2x rx+ J
s2
y y + J
s2
yy
2y2=2  (0 + 2)Js2 + 2Js1
	
=0
(34)
and is subject to the same BCs of the single-state case, i.e. (20) and (21). The
rst equation is the discounted Feynman-Kac equation - since no optimization
occurs in state s1 - while the second one is a Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equation
valid under optimality. The costs, s; q are determined through the specialist
optimization with (20) and (21). The optimization conditions for the specialist
can no longer be solved explicitly, and the derivatives of l; u with respect to
the costs s, q must be computed numerically. To solve the system, it is still
possible to write Js1;2 = x Is1;2( s) and transform the system itself into two
di¤erential equations in Is1;2(s).(
(0   1)Is1 + (  r)sIs10 + 22 2sIs100 + 1Js2 = 0
(0   2)Is2 + (  r)sIs20 + 22 2sIs200 + 2Js1 = 0:
(35)
The system (35) in Is1 and Is2 can be solved obtaining Is1 as a function of
Is2 from the second equation and substituting it in the rst equation. The rst
equation becomes a di¤erential equation of 4th order in Is2 . Solutions are in
the form:
Is2 = c1
x1
s + c2
x2
s + c3
x3
s + c4
x4
s (36)
where ci; i = 1; ::4 are constant, x1;2 = & 
p
1; x3;4 = & 
p
2; & = (r     
1=22)=(22)
1 =
p
( 2r   2  2)2   802
22
(37)
2 =
p
( 2r   2  2)2   4( 21   22 + 20)2
22
(38)
Hence, the specialists problem is solved by (36), provided that the constant 0
solves (18) and s, q satisfy (20), (21). There are three relevant intervals for 0:
In one of them the solutions for x1;2;3;4, are all reals; in a second there are two
reals and two imaginary solutions. In the third the solutions are all imaginary.
We report here the form of the value function in the last interval, since this is
26
the case which occurs in our numerical experiments below. With all imaginary
solutions for xi, the value function Is2 can be written as:
Is2 = & (A0si(1 log(s)) +B0co(1 log(s)) + C 0si(2 log(s)) +D0co(2 log(s)))
We set A0 = B0 = C 0 = D0 = 1 to avoid extra degrees of freedom. Is1 can be
found by substituting Is2 in the second equation of (36).
7.1.3 Equilibrium
In order to nd a solution, we need to solve for the nine unknowns , 0, s, q, l,
u, A, B, m the system of 9 equations (18,20,21,26,27,28,29,30,31). This is the
specialist-investor equilibrium when investors have the outside option to wait
and trade without costs.
7.2 Numerical results
The numerical method to solve the system is illustrated in Appendix C.
7.2.1 Base-case
We explore solutions for the parametric base-case above, namely  = 4,  r =
5%,2 = 4%; 0 = 3:85. We take as switching parameters 1 = 0:8, 2 = 0:2,
which implies a stationary distribution  = (0:2; 0:8). The parameters 1; 2
are therefore chosen so that the system spends 1=4 of time in the costless state
when t!1. We get 
; 0; s; q

= (0:0355; 1:1352; 89:17%; 90%);
with barriers equal to
l = 0:1448 <  < u = 1:2337:
In order to illustrate the di¤erences with respect to the single-state, or no-
outside-option case, let us recall that there the main endogenous quantities
were  
; 0; s; q

= (0:023428; 0:023687; 97:53%; 68:41%);
with barriers equal to
l = 0:301825 <  < u = 0:480013:
As expected from the elimination of the monopolisticposition of the specialist,
the welfare of the specialist decreases with respect to the single-state case. His
0 goes from 2.3% to 113%, which means that the rate of growth of his derived
utility is drastically reduced. The welfare of the investor does not improve: his
 moves in the same direction as the specialists one. However, the change is
much smaller, from 2.3% to 3.5%. This happens because there are states in
which he does not pay the price of immediacy, but he looses the intermediarys
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service of immediacy too. The slight change in his welfare signals that the two
e¤ects are almost comparable.
Since s is lower and q is higher in the new equilibrium, the overall transaction
costs go down. Transaction costs at the upper barrier go from 1  s = 2:5% to
10.83% , while those at the lower barrier go from 1=q   1 = 46:2% to 11.11% .
So, overall transaction costs 1=q  s go from 48.7% to 21.29%. Not only overall
costs go down, but they are more symmetric at the two barriers, since upper
costs increase little, lower costs dramatically decrease.
As for the intervention barriers, they widen, as intuition would suggest. The
investor is more tolerant with respect to current discrepancies from the Mertons
ratio, since he has a chance of being able to transact without costs in the future.
The boundaries still contain the Mertons ratio, where the investor optimally
sets his portfolio when no costs exist.
We can compare with the single-state base-case also the other relevant fea-
ture of the equilibrium, namely trade frequency. The rst time to trade requires
a more sophisticated computation than in the single-state case, since trade can
occur in both states. Aa a preliminary result useful just for the sake of com-
parison, we compute the rst time-to-trade conditionally on remaining in the
cost case (as if there were no other state, which is evidently a very rough upper
bound). This time, which was 0.5 before, raises up to almost 23 years.
7.2.2 Sensitivity analysis
Let us now vary the risk aversion of the specialist, in order to see how much
this a¤ects this non-monopolistic equilibrium and its comparison with the
monopolistic case. In Table 3 below we report the equilibria parameters
for the two cases - labeled respectively as non-mon and mon - when the
specialists risk aversion gets further from the investors one. For the monpolistic
case we report the gures down to 1  0 = 3:6, while for the non-monopolistic
case we go even further, to 1 0 = 3, where the monopolistic equilibrium would
give very high transaction costs.
Table 3
model 1  0 s q l u t 0 
mon 3.85 0.975 0.684 0.3018 0.4800 0.508 0.0236 0.0234
mon 3.6 0.841 0.560 0.2435 0.5647 2.973 0.0249 0.0234
non-mon 3.85 0.8917 0.9000 0.1448 1.2337 4.554 1.1352 0.0355
non-mon 3.6 0.8920 0.9000 0.1447 1.2315 4.544 1.1359 0.0355
non-mon 3 0.8328 0.9002 0.1449 1.8172 4.785 1.1400 0.0354
t for the non-monopolistic case is considered the time of rst intervention after
a switching to state s2. It is computed as the minimum time between the
transaction time to state s1 (costless intervention) and the time of the crossing
of one the barriers (costly intervention). The table conrms that, independently
of risk aversion, the investors option to wait and trade at no costs forces the
specialist to accept lower transaction costs. The bid-ask prices behavior as a
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function of the di¤erence between the agentsrisk aversions 0    is presented
in gure 4 below. The reader can appreciate the di¤erent level and symmetry
of costs with respect to the monopolistic equilibrium
[insert here gure 4]
The non transaction cone l    u is larger and the expected rst trade
time is higher in the non-monopolistic case. The e¤ect on costs is sizable and
welfare of the intermediary is drastically reduced. However, investors adjusts
the barriers - and the time to trade - so that the e¤ect on their welfare is almost
none.
8 Summary and conclusions
We characterized equilibrium bid-ask spreads and infrequent trade in symmetric-
information, intermediated markets. We actually specied two cases: either in-
vestors are obliged to trade with the specialist and incur into transaction costs,
comprehensive of physical costs, or they can wait until another trader - with
whom they can trade at no cost - arrives. In each economy, we provided the
optimality conditions for market participants. These conditions determine the
equilibrium bid and ask spreads, as well as the value functions of the agents and
intervention barriers - or trade - of the investor.
We studied rst the equilibrium in which trade occurs with the specialist
only. In equilibrium, trade is the local time of the Brownian motion at appro-
priate levels, namely the trading barriers of the investor. We proved numerically
that the equilibrium exists, at least for some combinations of risk aversion of
its participants, and that its bid-ask spreads and trade frequency increase with
the di¤erence in risk aversions of the specialist and investor. The analysis was
conducted both in the absence and in the presence of external trading costs.We
then extended the analysis to the case in which investors can also wait and
transact without paying the costs.
Our major contribution consists in endogenizing spreads and infrequent
trade. With no outside option, e¤ects on spreads are one order of magnitude
bigger than their causes. Both with and without trading costs, intermediation
imposes a price for immediacy which is very high in comparison to its moti-
vation, i.e. di¤erence in risk aversion, and very sensitive to changes in risk
attitudes. Also the departure of the barriers from the optimal portfolio mix in
the absence of costs is one order of magnitude bigger than the di¤erence in risk
aversion between market participants. Trade is infrequent, less than assumed
by partial equilibrium models, but so as to wash away the continuous readjust-
ments we often assume in continuous-time Finance. A small heterogeneity in
risk aversion, together with a monopolistic position of the specialist, is able to
produce high spreads and trade frequency of the order of months. The result
is encouraging, given the low level of risk-aversion heterogeneity observed in
recent empirical work. It may also be considered too strong, since our spreads
are high with respect to observed levels. In order to address this issue, we
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studied also the equilibrium in which investors have the outside-option to wait
and trade competitively. As expected, this option reduces the magnitude of the
bid-ask spreads, without wiping infrequent trade out. The e¤ect on costs is
strong and welfare of the intermediary is drastically reduced. Investors however
adjusts the barriers so that the e¤ect on their welfare - which in principle could
be negatively a¤ected too, since either they trade through the intermediary and
pay his rent, or must wait until a counterpart comes - is almost null.
Starting from exogenous costs - instead of endogenous spreads - Lo et al.
had already noticed the strong e¤ect of costly trading on prices, and made it a
sign of distinction of their theoretical contribution with respect to the previous
literature. Since they were not working in an intermediated market, they ex-
plained the strong impact of trading costs on prices via high-frequency trading
needs and xed costs. Maintaining the hypothesis of highly frequent trading-
needs, we explained rst-order e¤ects on prices and trade through the existence
of an intermediated market with its price for immediacy.
9 Appendix A
The three steps for solving the optimization problem of the investor are as
follows. First, we recognize that a candidate solution for the value function is
either
I() =  m [Asi( ln()) +Bco( ln())] (39)
where A;B  R; si and co are the trigonometric sine and cosine, or
I() = Ax1 + Bx2 (40)
where A;B  R; x1;2 = m . The type of solution depends on whether, having
dened
c.
:
=
 
  r   2=22
22
; (41)
we have  > (<)c: Indeed, the algebraic equation corresponding to (6), which
provides the roots x1;2, i.e.
2x2=2 +
 
  r   2=2x+  = 0 (42)
has imaginary solutions in the rst case, real in the second.
Second, we substitute both the rst and second order BCs into the ODE, so
as to obtain a second degree equation for the optimal barriers l and u, through
their transforms "l and "u. These are respectively the smaller and the bigger
root of the following equation:
 +  (  r) "+  (   1)2"2=2 = 0 (43)
whose discriminant we denote as  :

:
= 2(  r)2   2(   1)2 (44)
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Third, we make the determinant of the value-matching BCs, once written in
terms of (39) or (40), and considered as equations in (A;B) or (A;B), equal to
zero. This guarantees that the value function is non-null and stationary. The
determinant is equated to zero by a proper choice of the articial discount rate
, via . This means solving for  the algebraic equation
a(l; q)b(u; s)  c(u; s)d(l; q) = 0 (45)
whose entries are dened as in the text for the imaginary case. Analogous
expressions hold for the real case. The solution requires substitution of the
expressions for l; u; l; u in terms of the parameters   r;  and  itself.
10 Appendix B
In order to compute the derivatives in (19), we rst use the denition of "l and
"u, namely (7) and (8), we can determine explicitly the investors barriers:(
l = ND N q;
u = N
0
D N 0
1
s
(46)
where
D = (   1)2; (47)
N =  (  r) p; (48)
N 0 = N + 2
p
; (49)
Based on them, dependence of l on q and u on s acts both directly and via the
discount rate  (which equates the determinant of the value-matching conditions
to zero, and therefore depends on all the models variables, including q and s)
@l
@q =
1
D N
h
N + q D
2
(D N)p
@
@q
i
(50)
@u
@s =
1
s(D N 0)
h
 N 0
s   D
2
(D N 0)p
@
@s
i
(51)
Using the implicit function theorem to derive the discount rate sensitivities,
@
@q ;
@
@s ; one has:
@
@q
=  
b(u; s)@a(l;q)@q   c(u; s)@d(l;q)@q
@(ab cd)
@
(52)
@
@s
=  a(l; q)
@b(u;s)
@s   d(l; q)@c(u;s)@s
@(ab cd)
@
: (53)
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where the derivatives of a; b; c; d are easily obtained in closed form (separately
for the imaginary and real case). Putting the two together we have
@l
@q =
1
D N

N   q D2
(D N)p
b(u;s)
@a(l;q)
@q  c(u;s) @d(l;q)@q
@(ab cd)
@

(54)
@u
@s =
1
s(D N 0)

 N 0
s +
D2
(D N 0)p
a(l;q)
@b(u;s)
@s  d(l;q) @c(u;s)@s
@(ab cd)
@

(55)
which need to be substituted in the modied smooth pasting conditions as
well as in conditions (20) and (21). The latter enter into the equilibrium com-
putation.
11 Appendix C
The system of 9 equations (18,20,21,26,27,28,29,30,31) results to be time con-
suming to be solved in one step, especially in computing the numeric derivatives
in (20), (21). We noticed that the investor and the specialist problems are cou-
pled through s, q, l, u and the derivatives @l=@q, @u=@s. In particular, given s,
q it is possible to solve the investors problem (26,27,28,29,30,31). We solve the
system in three steps. At the rst step we solve the investors problem comput-
ing l, u, @l=@q, @u=@s at every point on a grid of values of 0:75 < s; q < 1 with
step 0.001. Even with a high number of points on the grid to be computed, this
method allows us to solve a smaller problem and starting from chosen initial pa-
rameters. To initialize the parameter estimation, we tted a linear relationship
between s and u and between q and l. This allowed us to use the Quasi-Newton
local search method. Moreover it permitted to compute the numerical deriva-
tives only across the grid. The solution of the investors problem is an array of
four values l, u, @l=@q, @u=@s for every point on the grid. At the second step we
t four splines curves for each of these variables. At the third step we solve the
investors problem (18,20,21) utilizing the splines tting in place of l, u, @l=@q,
@u=@s. After nding a solution, we rene and check the values of the solution
solving the initial system of 9 equation all together, using as initial guess the
solution found at step three.
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Figure 1: No-transaction cone in the single-agent (lp;up) and monopolistic,
general-equilibrium case (l; u). In both cases the optimal ratio of risky to risk-
less assets for the frinctionless market, , is included in the cone. The cone is
in the plane of the asset values (x; y).
Figure 2: Bid price s and inverse of the ask price q as a function of the di¤erence
between the investors and brokers risk aversion, 0    in the monopolistic
general-equilibrium.
34
Figure 3: Cone of no-transactions at equilibrium as a function of the di¤erence
between the investors and brokers risk aversion, 0  . The cone is written in
terms of the risky-to-riskless-asset ratio  = y=x, which stays between l and u.
As in gure one, the cone contains the frictionless ratio  in the monopolistic
general-equilibrium.
Figure 4: Bid price s and inverse of the ask price q as a function of the di¤erence
between the investors and brokers risk aversion, 0  in the non-monopolistic
general-equilibrium.
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